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By J. W. Hazel1,2, E. W. Clayton1,2,3, 
B. A. Malin2,4,5,6, C. Slobogin2,3
D
NA is an increasingly useful crime-
solving tool. But still quite unclear is 
the extent to which law enforcement 
should be able to obtain genetic data 
housed in public and private data-
bases. How one answers that ques-
tion might vary substantially, depending on 
the source of the data. Several countries—the 
United Kingdom, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia 
among them—have even toyed with creat-
ing a “universal” DNA database, populated 
with data from every individual in society, 
obviating the need for any other DNA source 
(1). Although this move would be controver-
sial, it may not be as dramatic as one might 
think. In the United States, for example, the 
combination of state and federal databases 
(containing genetic profiles of more than 16.5 
million arrestees and convicts) and public 
and private databases (containing genetic 
data of tens of millions of patients, consum-
ers, and research participants) already pro-
vides the government with potential access 
to genetic information that can be linked to 
a large segment of the country, either directly 
or through a relative (2, 3). We discuss here 
how, if correctly implemented, a universal 
database would likely be more productive 
and less discriminatory than our current sys-
tem, without compromising as much privacy.
   Current law enforcement methods of ge-
netic investigation are both haphazard and 
underregulated. In early 2018, U.S. law en-
forcement officers investigating the Golden 
State Killer case were able to home in on a 
suspect after querying GEDmatch, a publicly 
accessible database that encourages consum-
ers to upload genetic data coupled with per-
sonal identifiers in order to gain insights into 
their genealogy. Without authorization from 
a court, law enforcement simply pretended 
to be the donor of what was, in fact, crime 
scene DNA. Through that ruse, officers found 
a match to a person in the database who was 
distantly related to Joseph DeAngelo, the 
man ultimately arrested for the crimes. Since 
these revelations came to light last spring, 
multiple law enforcement agencies have 
used similar long-range familial searches of 
publicly accessible databases to close 13 cold 
cases, including several murders (2, 4). 
In the Golden State case, the government 
could justify its action by pointing to the fact 
that GEDmatch is advertised as a publicly ac-
cessible database—one that does not specifi-
cally ban the type of deception police used in 
that case. But publicly accessible databases 
are not the only source of genetic informa-
tion that law enforcement might query. For 
instance, if accessing such a database fails 
to yield a useful result, which will often be 
the case, law enforcement could resort to 
private databases, such as those maintained 
by direct-to-consumer (DTC) companies, e.g., 
23andMe and Ancestry.com. Although these 
databases are not as easily exploited as data-
bases meant to be accessed by the public, in 
most jurisdictions in the United States and 
throughout the world a subpoena is all that 
law enforcement needs to force those compa-
nies to determine whether they have a match 
with crime scene data. A subpoena only 
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DeAngelo, appears at his arraignment in 
Sacramento, California, in late April. 
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requires showing that the data sought are 
relevant to an investigation and is therefore 
much simpler to get than a warrant based on 
probable cause. 
Until now law enforcement has largely 
focused its efforts on targeting publicly ac-
cessible resources such as GEDmatch. But 
requests for privately maintained data are 
likely to become much more frequent in 
the future, given the increasing value of ge-
netic data to law enforcement, the low level 
of justification required for a subpoena, and 
the tremendous amount of effort that can be 
associated with long-range familial search-
ing by using a resource such as GEDmatch, 
which might generate dozens or hundreds of 
possible leads in a given case (2). 
If publicly accessible databases and DTC 
companies are of no help, law enforcement 
might try to access genetic data in the posses-
sion of healthcare providers and researchers. 
Again, only a subpoena is needed to obtain 
genetic information contained in patients’ 
electronic medical records under the U.S. 
Health Insurance Portability and Account-
ability Act of 1996 (5). And although biomed-
ical research efforts are often protected by 
government-issued Certificates of Confidenti-
ality (6), which purport to assure participants 
that research data are immune from court 
orders, the enhanced protections recently 
conveyed by the U.S. 21st Century Cures Act 
of 2016 remain largely untested in the courts. 
Further, because Certificates of Confidential-
ity typically apply only to research funded by 
the National Institutes of Health and other 
agencies within the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, genetic research 
funded by other sources remains largely un-
protected unless a request for a Certificate of 
Confidentiality is made and granted. 
Last, in addition to these public and pri-
vate resources, a government interested in 
using DNA to help solve crimes can maintain 
its own database. In the United States, many 
states and the federal government maintain 
DNA profiles not only of convicted felons but 
also of those simply arrested for a felony or, 
in some cases, even a misdemeanor (1). The 
U.S. Supreme Court has given its imprimatur 
to such databases (7). As we explain below, 
this development is one of the most potent 
reasons for considering establishment of a 
more comprehensive genetic database.
UNIVERSAL DATABASE
The first obvious benefit of a universal data-
base is its potential for solving or deterring 
serious crimes such as murder, rape, robbery, 
and burglary. As both research and anecdotal 
reports indicate, DNA matches have often 
been crucial in catching the perpetrators of 
such crimes and useful in identifying bod-
ies and remains as well (8, 9). Unfortunately, 
from law enforcement’s perspective, foren-
sic databases that contain only genetic data 
of arrestees and those convicted of crimes 
have serious limitations, a fact demonstrated 
by law enforcement’s increasing reliance on 
publicly accessible and private databases, 
composed almost entirely of “innocent” indi-
viduals. And when law enforcement chooses 
the latter route, a match is by no means 
guaranteed; additionally, considerable inef-
ficiency is likely if the effort to find a match 
requires consulting numerous companies, all 
of which may need to re-analyze their sample 
to generate the relevant profile.
Just as important, a universal database 
would eliminate or reduce problems asso-
ciated with the current haphazard genetic 
investigative regime. First, such a database 
would virtually erase the government’s in-
centive to conduct long-range familial DNA 
searches of the type used in the Golden State 
Killer case. It would thus markedly alleviate 
the impact on innocent people who happen 
to be related to criminals and whom police 
are likely to treat as suspects unless and until 
countervailing evidence surfaces. 
Second, a universal database would elimi-
nate the temptation on the part of law en-
forcement to use public, DTC, or research 
databases for investigative purposes. Indeed, 
for reasons we give below, universal database 
legislation should prohibit  law enforcement 
officials from trawling nongovernmental 
DNA sources such as GEDMatch, Ancestry.
com and research-oriented databases. That 
in turn might enhance research into diseases, 
treatments, and other socially beneficial av-
enues because studies indicate that many 
people, especially those of color, are reluctant 
to provide genetic information to researchers 
out of fear it will be misused by the govern-
ment (10, 11). 
Last, a universal database would be less 
discriminatory than the government’s cur-
rent method of compelling genetic samples. 
If the government collects DNA only from 
convicted individuals or only from individu-
als arrested for serious crimes—as is true as 
a matter of law in the United Kingdom and 
as a practical matter with the U.S. Combined 
DNA Index System (CODIS)—there is real 
concern that the resulting databases will be 
skewed against the disadvantaged because 
they are the ones most likely to be the focus 
of such convictions and arrests. 
The situation in the United States has been 
exacerbated by federal, state, and local gov-
ernments now creating “shadow” databases 
(9)—not only of people arrested for any crime 
but also of people who are merely stopped 
on suspicion of having committed a crime 
without being arrested (the so-called “stop-
and-spit” and “swab-and-go” practices). As a 
result, arrest-based DNA databases contain a 
huge proportion of the young nonwhite male 
population and a much smaller representa-
tion of other groups (9, 12). Indeed, that is 
why police had to rely on a publicly accessible 
database to catch the Golden State Killer, a 
white former police officer; in sharp contrast 
to government DNA caches such as CODIS, 
public and DTC databases tend to contain the 
genetic data of predominately white individ-
uals, generally from higher income brackets. 
Despite these advantages of a universal 
database, many concerns have been raised 
about its privacy implications and the associ-
ated potential for misuse of genetic informa-
tion. As a result, in some countries a universal 
database is clearly prohibited. In S. and 
Marper v. United Kingdom (13), the European 
Court of Human Rights concluded that the 
indefinite retention of biological samples and 
profiles (including not only genetic data but 
also fingerprints and other biological infor-
mation) is a violation of the right to privacy 
protected under the European Convention of 
Human Rights. That not only spells doom for 
universal genetic databases, it also prohibits 
long-term databases composed of profiles of 
people who are arrested but not convicted. 
In response to Marper, the United Kingdom, 
which had been retaining the DNA samples 
of virtually all arrestees, now destroys such 
samples immediately if collected from indi-
viduals charged with minor crimes and after 
3 years for those arrested for serious crimes. 
Although Marper applies only in the Council 
of Europe’s 47 member countries, many other 
countries follow its dictates (1).
ALLAYING CONCERNS
To some extent, the decision in Marper is 
based on fear that those in the database will 
be associated with criminality. But that draw-
back is specific to databases that focus on 
arrestees; the criminal stigma of being in a 
database is eliminated if everyone’s DNA is 
acquired. More relevant is Marper’s objec-
tion that broad collection of genetic material 
might increase “the risk of abuse and arbi-
trariness” (13). These concerns would clearly 
be raised by the establishment of a universal 
database, but they can be allayed in a number 
of ways. 
Most important to recognize is that a fo-
rensic database would only require a subset 
of genetic markers with little to no medical 
relevance. Profiles would consist of a few 
dozen short-tandem repeats, with perhaps a 
modest expansion of the 20 CODIS loci cur-
rently used to improve the identification of 
degraded samples or the addition of a lim-
ited subset of “forensic” single-nucleotide 
polymorphisms to enhance the identifica-
tion of more distant relatives in the rare in-
stances in which familial searches were still 
needed (3). As a result, these law enforce-
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ment profiles would reveal substantially 
less sensitive information than the thou-
sands (or hundreds of thousands) of genetic 
variants, often coupled with individual and 
family medical histories, that are found in 
the healthcare, research, or DTC ecosystems 
that law enforcement might otherwise be 
tempted to commandeer. 
Many other protections against misuse 
of DNA databases can and should be cre-
ated by the relevant legis-
lative body (which, in the 
United States, would be 
Congress, given the nation-
wide impact of the law). 
For instance, legislation 
could require that genetic 
data not only be uncoupled 
from any personal identi-
fiers within the system, as 
it is in CODIS, but also es-
tablish a more robust “unmasking” process 
that limits law enforcement access to any 
personal information until an association 
has been made and confirmed (a proce-
dure better monitored through one central 
system than state-by-state or company-by-
company). In further contrast to the current 
system, legislation might limit access to the 
database to specific circumstances, such as 
investigations into felonies and identifica-
tion of missing persons’ remains. 
Universal database legislation should also 
require that the DNA database be housed in 
an independent agency and that access to it 
be authorized by a warrant (not just a sub-
poena) based on probable cause to believe a 
match will produce a perpetrator (a showing 
that is usually impossible with a database 
that is not universal). Most important, the 
law should require that the physical samples 
analyzed to create the database be destroyed 
after obtaining the relevant genetic informa-
tion, to mitigate the risk that the sample will 
be subjected to further analysis or used for 
purposes other than populating the database. 
Additional privacy protection could be re-
alized through emerging cryptographic pro-
tocols that control access to genomic data 
through multiple keys. Where more than one 
organization is required to “turn the key” to 
decrypt any record, the risk of a rogue in-
dividual or agency misusing the resource is 
substantially mitigated (14). Simultaneously, 
because law enforcement needs would be 
fully met, Congress should (and probably 
would) severely restrict the ability of law 
enforcement to search other health-care, re-
search, or DTC databases, increasing trust 
in these activities and avoiding government 
access to the more complete genetic informa-
tion housed there.
Whatever its precise structure, the most 
important point is that the population-wide 
nature of the database would all but guar-
antee the adoption of strong security mea-
sures such as those just described, as well as 
the enactment of harsh penalties for abuse 
of the type currently associated with misuse 
of data in CODIS (a fine of up to $250,000 
or imprisonment for up to 1 year). That is 
because members of Congress would know 
that government DNA harvesting would no 
longer focus solely on out-groups but would 
also sweep in their own 
DNA. As the ubiquity of 
federal and state legislation 
strictly regulating the pri-
vacy of communications re-
cords and tax information 
suggests, slippery-slope 
concerns about govern-
ment collection and exploi-
tation of every citizen’s full 
genetic makeup dissipate 
in a regime in which legislators, their kin, 
and their key constituents will be affected 
just like everyone else. 
These concerns are further minimized in 
jurisdictions such as the United States and 
Europe that, unlike many countries that have 
considered a universal database, have codi-
fied basic privacy protections that would mit-
igate the potential for abuse or misuse of the 
data (for example, the Privacy Act of 1974 and 
the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination 
Act in the U.S., and the General Data Protec-
tion Regulation in Europe).
IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
There remain implementation issues that 
would need to be debated by the public and 
ultimately resolved by Congress, including 
whether a universal database should be pop-
ulated by obtaining samples from all new-
borns or instead through a census-style effort 
(or a combination of both), how to collect the 
DNA of visitors from other countries, and the 
appropriate incentives to promote compli-
ance with the program. 
The ethical objections to mandating fo-
rensic profiling of newborns and/or compel-
ling every citizen or visitor to submit to a 
buccal swab or to spit in a cup when they 
have done nothing wrong are not trivial. But 
newborns are already subject to compul-
sory medical screening, and people coming 
from foreign countries to the United States 
already submit to fingerprinting. It is also 
worth noting that concerns about coercion 
or invasions of privacy did not give pause to 
legislatures (or, for that matter, even the Eu-
ropean Court) when authorizing compelled 
DNA sampling from arrestees, who should 
not forfeit genetic privacy interests simply 
by virtue of being arrested.
A universal database would not be cheap; 
extrapolating from a $20- to $40-per-profile 
estimate for the existing CODIS system cal-
culated in 2010 (15), compiling a database 
of ~350 million people could cost between 
$7.5 billion and $15 billion dollars. Although 
this figure does not include implementation 
costs (which are difficult to estimate), the 
economies of scale associated with a univer-
sal system, coupled with the declining cost 
of forensic profiling, would likely drive this 
figure lower. 
In addition, the societal and economic 
benefits that could be derived from the sys-
tem could easily offset these costs. Criminal 
activity is extremely expensive for private 
citizens (both monetarily and in terms of 
intangible harms to victims), third parties 
(such as businesses and insurers), and the 
government (for police investigations and 
incarceration). There is evidence that ex-
isting forensic databases have more than 
made up for their initial costs by increasing 
the efficiency, accuracy, and success rate of 
ongoing criminal investigations and by de-
terring would-be criminals (15). 
At the very least, putting the idea of a uni-
versal forensic database on the table would 
spur a long overdue debate about the deficien-
cies of the current system and, more broadly, 
our societal commitment to privacy, fairness, 
and equal protection under the law. j
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